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1 Introduction 
This paper focuses on proposed Amendment 167 of the Criminal Finances Act 
2017, by which Bermuda (and other British Overseas Territories) would be forced to 
adopt public registers of beneficial ownership. This paper assesses the potential legal 
imposition of a public register of beneficial ownership via Order in Council on 
Bermuda both practically and theoretically. Ultimately, this piece attempts to answer 
the broad question of: Is an imposition of a public register of beneficial ownership by 
the UK in Bermuda justified? To this end, an all-encompassing legal discussion will 
ensue, utilising academic and practitioner thought, political discourse, and legislative 
assessment to lend clarity to an emerging legal theme: company ownership 
transparency broadly, as well as specifically in relation to UK-Bermuda. Standing at 
the intersection of regulatory policy and international legal relations, this paper finds 
the exact value of public registers not only questionable in current academic and 
practitioner thought, but also unnecessary in the unique case of Bermuda. Further, it is 
found, after analysis of Bermuda’s financial sector, legal framework, and tax system 
that the imposition of a public register in Bermuda is fundamentally flawed on both a 
legal and logical basis. Because of the two points made above, it is concluded overall 
that the UK imposition of a public register in Bermuda cannot be justified. 
	  
1.1 Background 
Ahead of the 39th Group of 8 (G8) Summit hosted by the UK on the 17th and 
18th of June 2013, British leaders signified commitment to a series of provisions 
intended to promote greater cooperation between tax jurisdictions and overall greater 
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tax transparency.1 Prime Minister David Cameron expressed his determination to 
make considerable progress on both ensuring tax compliance and promoting greater 
transparency, two of three main thematic discussions of 2013's G8 Summit.2 These 
discussions spoke to the Prime Minister’s broader agenda: “fairer taxes, open trade 
and increased transparency”3. Dubbed ‘the three t’s’, taxes, trade and transparency 
were demonstrated to have profound importance for 21st century governance. It is 
important to understand, from the outset, that the challenge the UK is trying to tackle 
is very real: “In November, the Tax Justice Network (TJN) published the biggest ever 
survey of global financial secrecy. An estimated $21 to $32 trillion of private 
financial wealth is located, untaxed or lightly taxed, in ‘secrecy jurisdictions’ (or tax 
havens)4 This was further conveyed in David Cameron’s foreword as Prime Minister 
on the 2013 UK G8 Presidency Report: 
 
“[The three t’s] are all essential components of the global economic race 
we’re in. When taxes are not paid, people suffer and public trust in business is 
corroded. When trade isn’t free, all our economies lose out. When transparency is 
lacking, the wealth of a nation cannot be properly shared with its people. All these 
areas demand political leadership in equal measure.”5 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Daniel Boffey et al ‘Tax havens agree to Cameron clampdown’ The Guardian (London, 15 June 
> last clampdown-cameron-havens-https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/15/tax2013) < 
accessed 2/4/2017  
2 United Kingdom Government, ‘UK Presidency of G8’  (UK, date N/A) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/g8-2013 > last accessed 4/4/2017 
3United Kingdom Government, 'Trade, Tax & Transparency: The 2013 UK G8 Presidency Report' 
(2013) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/271676/G8_report_W
EB_FINAL.PDF > last accessed 4/4/2017 
4 Ethical Consumer, ‘The UK is the most important player in tax havens’ (Date N/A) 
<http://www.ethicalconsumer.org/commentanalysis/ethicaleconomics/theukandtaxhavens.aspx> last 
accessed 5/4/2017 
5 (no3)  
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But where do Britain’s Overseas Territories (BOTs), commonly referred to as 
“tax havens”, fit into such an encompassing agenda? As a matter of fact, the UK is 
closely interlinked to a wider “network of British secrecy jurisdictions around the 
world”6 comprising of 3 crown dependencies and 14 overseas territories, including 
“offshore giants”7 the British Virgin Islands (BVI), Cayman Islands, and Bermuda. 
Public discourse surrounding such jurisdictions has seen a steady rise in recent years, 
with critics claiming that “such places are used by companies for tax avoidance or 
evasion”8 facilitated through jurisdictional hallmarks of “low taxes and light touch 
regulation” 9   These micro-jurisdictions were, however, at the forefront of G8 
transparency talks. David Cameron made clear his intention to bring about heightened 
scrutiny to British professionals who use shell companies in “offshore tax havens” in 
an attempt to conceal the identity of ultimate beneficiaries, accusing some territories 
of “doing enough to tackle tax evasion and money laundering”10. In a letter to 10 
BOTs ahead of the G8 Summit, Cameron urged jurisdictions to “"get their house in 
order"11, encouraging commitment to international treaties on tax which included 
obligations such as the automatic exchange of information and central registers of 
beneficial ownership. As a result of UK-OT negotiations stemming from G8 
initiatives, BOTs reached automatic information exchange agreements with the UK, 
France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Further to this, OTs fully committed to both the 
OECD’s Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Tax Justice Network, ‘Narrative Report on United Kingdom’ Financial Secrecy Index (2015) 
> last accessed 3/4/2017 http://www.financialsecrecyindex.com/PDF/UnitedKingdom.pdf<  
7 ibid  
8 BBC, ‘David Cameron warns overseas territories on tax’ BBC Business (London, 20 May 2013) 
> last accessed 7/4/2017 22592662-c.com/news/businesshttp://www.bb<  
9 ibid  
10 Rowena Mason, ‘David Cameron says not enough is being done to tackle tax evasion’ The Guardian 
(London, 30 September 2015) <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/sep/30/david-cameron-
tax-evasion-british-overseas-territories > last accessed 3/4/2017 
11 (no7)  
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Matters12 and the establishment of central registries of beneficial ownership.13 These 
noteworthy steps, just two of many since, signify a considerable advancement towards 
Cameron’s aim of greater tax transparency in the OTs, as UK and other signatories of 
the Convention will be better able to access information imperative to the prosecution 
of cross-border tax evasion and avoidance such as detailed bank account data and 
beneficial ownership of overseas assets.  
 
With the above taken in consideration, it is plain to see that both the UK and 
its OTs have a public commitment to the emerging global agenda of transparency. 
The UK’s own commitments explored later in this paper coupled with legislative 
advancement in the OTs display a clear willingness to engage in cooperative policy 
making on a regulatory front. These commitments and legislative advancements, 
however, were almost immediately perceived to be inadequate as the Panama Papers 
leak rocked the offshore, and wider, world in 2015. Consisting of 11.5 million 
documents amounting to the records of 214,000 offshore companies, the Panama 
Papers is the biggest data security breach history, surpassing even the Snowden Files. 
The anonymous source had captured the entire internal database of major Panamanian 
law firm Mossack Fonesca, which specialised in setting up anonymous offshore shell 
companies.14 This massive leak, unsurprisingly, left a immense impression on a 
global scale: “…show[ing] how a global industry of law firms and big banks sells 
financial secrecy to politicians, fraudsters and drug traffickers as well as billionaires, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Joint Council of Europe/OECD Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Matters 
(1988,2010) OECD <http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-
information/Convention_On_Mutual_Administrative_Assistance_in_Tax_Matters_Report_and_Explan
ation.pdf > last accessed 24/4/2017 
13 Gabelle Tax, ‘Singapore and British Overseas Territories agree to tax transparency’ Abbey Tax  
(London, 21 June 2013) <http://www.gabelletax.com/blog/2013/06/21/singapore-and-british-overseas-
territories-agree-to-tax-transparency/> last accessed 21/4/2017 
14Bastian Obermayer et al, "The Panama Papers: Breaking the Story of How the Rich and Powerful 
Hide Their Money" (2017)  
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celebrities and sports stars”15, helping clients to evade or avoid taxes.  The high 
profile nature of Mossack Fonesca clients embroiled in the leak further exacerbated 
global outrage, exposing “…offshore companies controlled by the prime minister of 
Iceland, the king of Saudi Arabia, and the prime minister of Pakistan…”16 It now 
appeared in plain sight that "those who dutifully paid their taxes were, in fact, dupes. 
The rich...had exited from the messy business of tax long ago."17 This triggered harsh 
reaction from both governments and societies across the world, especially as leaked 
documents were found to “also include at least 33 people and companies blacklisted 
by the U.S. government because of evidence that they’d been involved in 
wrongdoing, such as doing business with Mexican drug lords, terrorist organizations 
like Hezbollah or rogue nations like North Korea and Iran.” 18  Public anger 
surrounding the leak and offshore jusridtions was considerable, as “the Panama 
Papers reinforce the perceptions of widespread injustice in the financial and taxation 
systems”, raising serious questions surrounding global and nationality inequality. 
Offshore jurisditions were seen to be a large part of the problem with  fragmented 
taxation systems believed to establish a “disproportionate burden on individual 
taxpayers, exacerbate inequality, and resort to debt by governments” 19  Non 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Lisa Main et al, ‘Panama Papers and Mossack Fonesca Explained’ ABC News (Australia, Date 
N/A) <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-04-04/explained-what-are-the-leaked-mossack-fonseca-
panama-papers/7270690 > last accessed 26/4/2017 
16 International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, ‘Giant Leak of Offshore Financial Records 
Exposes Global Array of Crime and Corruption’ ICIJ (3 April 2016) 
<https://panamapapers.icij.org/20160403-panama-papers-global-overview.html  > last accessed 
6/3/2017 
17 (no13)  
18 (no16)  
19 Hira, 'Understanding Offshore Finance: The Panama Papers in Perspective' (SFU, 2016) < 
https://wpsa.research.pdx.edu/papers/docs/anilhira.pdf > accessed 20/4/2017 
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Governmental Organisations (NGOs) demanded steps be taken to tackle tax evasion 
and avoidance, citing moral obligations for governments worldwide to take action.20 
 
 In the wake of such backlash, the British government promised a series of 
measures intended to counteract tax avoidance and evasion. This culminated in the 
Criminal Finances Act 2017, a ground-breaking legal step towards transparency. 
Included in the Act are heightened powers and controls, including HM Revenue and 
Customs (HMRC)’s ability to “impose civil penalties on accountants, advisers, and 
other financial professionals who give planning or advice or physically move funds 
offshore.”21 This legislation will be at the centre of this paper’s discussion, and must 
be fully viewed in the context of UK’s push for greater transparency in it’s territories 
as established through this section.  
 
Of particular focus within the Act itself is is a proposed Amendment 167 put 
forth by Baroness Stern during the 2nd day of the Criminal Finances Bill Committee 
debate in the House of Lords, a clause directly relevant to Carribean BOTs as it would 
force them to adopt public registers of beneficial ownership: 
 
“…the Secretary of State must provide all reasonable assistance to the 
governments of—(a) Anguilla;(b) Bermuda;(c) the British Virgin Islands;(d) the 
Cayman Islands;(e) Montserrat; and(f) the Turks and Caicos Islands,to enable each 
of those governments to establish a publicly accessible register of the beneficial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20Fiona Gartland, ‘Panama Papers: NGOs call for transparency on taxation’ The Irish Times (Ireland, 4 
April 2016) <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/panama-papers-ngos-call-for-
transparency-on-taxation-1.2597795 > last accessed 24/4/2016 
21 Richard Crump ‘UK Softens Ownership Rules for Overseas Territories’ Law360 (London, 24 April 
2017) <https://www.law360.com/articles/916452> last accessed 25/4/2017 
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ownership of companies registered in that government's jurisdiction.(3) The second 
step is that, no later than 31 December 2019, the Secretary of State must prepare an 
Order in Council, and take all reasonable steps to ensure its implementation, in 
respect of any Overseas Territories listed in subsection (2) that have not by that date 
introduced a publicly accessible register of the beneficial ownership of companies 
within their jurisdiction, requiring them to adopt such a register.”22 
 
 It is vital to note that such a bold legal position did not suddenly appear: 
rather it is a result of years of gradual progress towards tax transparency in the UK-
OT relationship. From the context gained through this section, it is logical to conclude 
that the UK felt frustrated by its OTs in the Panama Papers, triggering anger within 
British lawmakers as previously celebrated accomplishments were perceived to be 
insufficient. This work explores the legal, philosophical, and logical arguments 
surrounding such a drastric legislative proposal in the form of proposed Amendment 
167. 
1.2 Framing of the Problem 
 
The signifigance of an imposition of a public beneficial ownership registry in 
the case of Bermuda as put forward by Amendment 6 to the Criminal Finances Bill 
2017 via Order in Council must not be understated. As will be become evident 
throughout this piece, acts of forceful legislation by Britain upon its territories is a 
bold, and drastic, legal measure. This is often waged against Bermuda, along with 
other territories, as a threat. Such a legal act from one self-governing nation to another 
must be justified. This work aims to lend legal grounding to a highly emotive issue in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 HL Deb 3 April 2017, vol 782, col 833  
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public discourse, by assessing the justification of such a measure upon Bermuda 
through the exploration of more specific research questions.  
 
In researching this piece, Bermuda emerged as a clearly unique case. 
Commonly grouped with, Cayman, BVI, and TCI meticulous research suggested this 
association was not always beneficial, or fair, to mid-Atlantic Bermuda. The largest in 
population, and most developed of the BOTs, the island enjoys some of the highest 
standards of living in the world; having “the fourth highest per capita income 
in the world, about 70% higher than that of the US.”23 Commonly branded a 
“secrecy jurisdiction” or “tax haven”, it was found throughought the research process 
that Bermuda is largely misunderstood in public and political discourse. Difference in 
legal framework, constitution, industry, financial regulation, geography, population, 
development, and most importantly the registering of beneficial owners,  all set 
Bermuda apart from its Carribean siblings. By presenting the legal and governmental 
data gathered throughout research, this work sets out the case of Bermuda, 
emphasising its exceptionality and assessing the jurisdiction in regards to the potential 
imposition of a public beneficial ownership registry. As this paper continues,  it will 
become apparent that there are signifigant fundamental flaws in the UK position, both 
on a legal and logical basis. It is important to note that this work considers beneficial 
ownership extremely important in combatting the use of corporate vehicles for illicit 
purposes. There is, however, a distinction between beneficial ownership registers and 
public beneficial ownership registers. The latter, it will be argued, is not appropriate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Central Intelligence Agency, ‘The World Factbook’ CIA (Date N/A) 
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bd.html> accessed 5/5/2017 
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for Bermuda at this time, given its current legal framework and state of international 
commitments to such a register. 
 
Just as Britain’s threat to legislate for Bermuda must be justified, this research 
must be justified. With an extremely contemporary legislative focus, the findings of 
this piece have the potential to be a call for further scrutiny of such legal methods 
threatened by lawmakers as evidenced in chapter 2. This piece finds the case for 
Bermuda’s unique treatment in terms of Amendment 167, exposing an explicit need 
for lawmakers to assess each BOT individually, as a “one size fits all” approach is not 
only unfair, but also potentially damaging to Bermuda. The findings of this research 
imply the need for a shift in thinking in terms of Bermuda as a financial centre. The 
significance of such a legal imposition upon Bermuda (and other OTs) is to be 
recognised in both literature and political discourse. In addition to this, academic 
literature on the Overseas Territories on all fronts is severely insufficient, especially 
in the case of Bermuda. In undertaking the analysis of potential UK legislation 
directly relevant to Bermuda, this work may serve to call for further research on 
Bermuda as a unique jurisdiction while also helping to fill the gap in literature. 	  
This dissertation will continue as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 builds the foundation of this study by assessing proposed 
Amendment 167 of the Criminal Finances Act 2017. Firstly, the motives, legal 
method via Order in Council, and political rhetoric surrounding Amendment 167 will 
be explored as the legislative proposal under scrutiny in this work. Secondly, 
understanding of the matter of imposition- a public beneficial ownership registry- will 
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be built by elaborating the importance of beneficial owners, the objectives and 
arguments of such a register, and the UK’s own register. Lastly, academic thought in 
the form of tax morality will be explored in direct relation to the Panama Papers, the 
perceived trigger of the desire for such a register. This chapter will enable the reader 
to gain an understanding of the subject matter under scrutiny throughout this research. 
 
Chapter 3 presents the case of Bermuda in regards to proposed amendments 
to the Criminal Finances Act. Research of Bermuda’s industry, financial sector, and 
relevant points of constitution will be presented, lending voice to a vastly under-
researched perspective. Bermuda’s current legal framework for a beneficial 
ownership registry will be analysed as well as recent bilateral and multilateral terms. 
This chapter builds the lens through which the subject matter in chapter 1 is looked 
upon.  
 
Chapter 4 will merge chapters 2 and 3, as the subject matter explored in 
chapter 2 is analysed through the lens of Bermuda as built in chapter 3. This chapter 
will contain key analysis by cross-examining Bermuda’s current legal framework and 
the UK’s potential public beneficial ownership registry imposition. Comparative 
analysis of both the UK and Bermuda’s legal beneficial ownership regime will unfold, 
making useful statements regarding the justification of such an imposition. Cost and 
benefit analysis of a public register of beneficial ownership in Bermuda will follow, 
presenting the stark reality of such an imposition. Lastly, and most critically, the legal 
challenges of the UK’s legal intention will be explored, unearthing constitutional 
violations and legal uncertainty.  
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Chapter 5 will present the final argument of this work in line with previously 
examined research findings, looking toward the future in Britain’s push for company 
ownership transparency in Bermuda and other territories. 
 
1.3 Objectives of the Research 
• Analyse Bermuda’s beneficial ownership regime in contrast to UK 
• Assess the necessity for a public beneficial ownership registry in Bermuda 
• Assess the legal viability of the UK imposition of a public register of 
beneficial ownership in Bermuda via Order in Council 
In reaching these research objectives, this work is able to answer the broader question 
at hand: 
• Can the imposition of a public register of beneficial ownership by the UK on 
Bermuda be justified? 
	  
1.4 Research Questions 
• How does Bermuda’s beneficial ownership regime compare to the UK’s?	  
	  
• How comprehensive is Bermuda’s current legal framework regarding 
beneficial ownership? 
	  
• Is the potential use of Order in Council relating to matters of company 
ownership legally viable in the case of Bermuda? 
 
• Can the imposition of a public register of beneficial ownership by the UK on 
Bermuda be justified? 




This study utilises desktop-based research. Evidence and sources for analysis 
were gathered in an attempt to fulfill specific research objectives. These include 
governmental documents from both Bermuda and the UK, parliamentary debate and 
communications, academic books and journals, reports from various multilateral 
organisations, and contemporary articles from various news and legal internet 
sources. This work focuses upon the Criminal Finances Act 2017, drawing sources 
from both UK and Bermuda legislation in an attempt to view the proposed UK 
imposition of public registers of beneficial ownership through the lens of Bermuda’s 
legal framework. 
 
1.6 Scope and Limitations 
 
Telling of Bermuda’s widespread misconception is the aim of this research 
project at it's inception. Originally, this work was intended to analyse the necessity 
and legal basis for an imposition of a public beneficial ownership registry upon 
Bermuda, BVI, and Cayman. However, as research progressed Bermuda emerged as a 
unique in relation to its Carribean siblings, presenting a far more complex case than 
originally imaged. The scope of this piece is adjusted to reflect such findings. Further 
to this, due to time and resource constrains, this work was unable to grapple with 
theoretical questions of tax evasion vs avoidance and financial secrecy vs. privacy. 
These discussions require inclusion of an enormous amount of academic writing. This 
could be possible if further work regarding this subject, in PhD format, was 
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undertaken. Lastly, as the focal point of this piece is an extremely contemporary 
topic, there was a noticeable lack of secondary academic writing upon relevant 
matters. Though this posed an obstacle, this piece attempts to fill such a gap through 
the use of UK and Bermuda Government documents, reports and briefings. In 
addition to this, writings from multilateral organisations such as FATF and the OECD 
proved invaluable to this work 
 
 
Chapter II: Britain’s Appetite for Transparency 	  
2.1 The Criminal Finances Act 2017 
	  
The Criminal Finances Act 2017 (‘the Act’), receiving royal assent on 27 
April 2017, is a hallmark piece of legislation in Britain’s push for transparency. The 
Act can essentially be viewed as Britain’s legislative response to the Panama Papers 
scandal, encapsulating modern views towards company ownership and indeed 
transparency in policy overall. It acts to “amend the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002; 
make provision in connection with terrorist property; create corporate offences 
for…facilitation of tax evasion; and for connected purposes”24 The Act is split into 
three fundamental parts, with Part 1 concerning money laundering, crime proceeds, 
new enforcement powers, and civil recovery. Authorities are granted new powers to 
seize assets and request information. Part 2 deals with terrorist property, extending 
AML and asset recovery capabilities to matters falling under POCA and the 
Terrorism Act 2002, making. Part 3, of specific relevance to this dissertation, create 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 UK Parliament 'Criminal Finances Act 2017' Parliamentary Publications (Date N/A) 
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two new corporate offences of failure to prevent facilitation of tax evasion: failure to 
prevent facilitation of both UK and overseas evasion. 25 
 
 The introduction of two new criminal offences displays the UK government’s 
intention to clamp down on relevant professionals who intentionally facilitate the tax 
evasion of their clients. The corporations employing such professionals will be held 
accountable for their actions, risking corporate failure to prevent the facilitation of tax 
evasion and therefore falling foul of the law. This criminal offence joins a range of 
statutory offences for evading tax, including section 72 of the Value Added Tax Act 
199426 and Section 106A of the Taxes Management Act 197027. The extension of 
legislation as evidenced in Part 3 gives authorities more teeth in terms of scrutinising 
corporate behaviour. 28 
 
Proposed Amendment 167 to the Act, as put forth by Baroness Stern, can be 
seen as a clear extension of these offences. Whilst targeting corporations believed to 
facilitate tax evasion, it appears the proposed amendment intends also to target 
jurisdictions believed to facilitate tax evasion. In essence, offences related to 
facilitation have been broadened immensely in Amendment 167; from corporations to 
nations. As discussed in the first chapter, BOTs are often accused of being ‘tax 
havens’, facilitating tax evasion by providing low-tax environments shrouded in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 HL, 'Criminal Finances Bill' (Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, 21/3/2017) 
<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/lddelreg/140/140.pdf > last accessed 1/5/2017 
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28UK Parliament 'Criminal Finances Bill: Explanatory Notes' (Date N/A) 
<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2016-2017/0075/en/17075en03.htm > last accessed 
1/5/2017 
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secrecy. It is plain to see that their inclusion in Baroness Stern’s proposal is an 
attempt to target those jurisdictions widely perceived to facilitate such evasion. 
 
2.2 Proposed Amendment 167: A Closer Look 
 
In order to fully and accurately assess Bermuda’s standing in regards to the 
proposed amendment requiring the establishment of a public register of beneficial 
ownership, it is imperative to understand the motivations of, exceptions to, and legal 
means of such a proposal. On the second day of the Criminal Finances Bill 
Committee debate in the House of Lords on 3 April 2017, Baroness Stern rose to lend 
clarity to amendment as a proposed new clause. 
 
The amendment specifically calls for the UK government to strengthen its 
stance on transparency in its OTs, ensuring that all OTs with financial centres 
(Anguilla, Bermuda, BVI, Cayman, Montserrat and TCI) permit the publication of 
beneficial ownership information as collected by their central registries. What is first 
required is that the UK government assist targeted territories with the process of 
establishing such registers, to be in place and fully functioning, by 2018. Stern goes a 
step further, proposing “that if help, support, and encouragement is not successful in 
getting registers into the public domain, the Government should secure compliance 
through an Order in Council by December 2019.”29 The imposition of public registers 
on OTs was met with widespread support in both the House of Lords and Commons, 
where a similar amendment was previously tabled, receiving cross-party 
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support.30More details on legal imposition via Order in Council will be expanded 
upon in upcoming subsection 2.1.2. 
 
The amendment’s focus upon the British Overseas Territories as offshore 
centres was justified by Stern calling attention to the resignation of the Prime Minister 
of Iceland, who lost the faith of his electorate as information about wealth held in a 
company registered in BVI came to light.31 Stern also echoed sentiments expressed in 
the House of Commons International Development Select Committee’s 2016 report 
‘Tackling Corruption Overseas’ that “lack of transparency in the [OTs]…will 
significantly hinder efforts to curb global corruption and continue to damage the UK’s 
reputation as a leader on anti-corruption.”32 
 
The motivations behind the proposal have been outlined as distinctly moral in 
nature as it intends to “address offshore banking and the secrecy that surrounds it”33. 
Baroness Stern stated that the amendment “stems from [the Government’s] concern to 
fight grand corruption and tax evasion- two ills that damage the wellbeing of millions 
of people in a large number of countries, and increase insecurity, instability and 
violence worldwide.” 34  Citing an Oxfam report 35  quoted by the International 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30George Crozier, ‘Criminal Finances Bill clears Commons’ Chartered Institute of Taxation (London, 7 
March 2017) <http://www.tax.org.uk/media-centre/blog/media-and-politics/criminal-finances-bill-
clears-commons > last accessed 8/5/2017 
31 HL Deb 3 April 2017, vol 782, col 833 
 
32 HC, 'Tackling corruption overseas' (International Development Committee, 19 October 2016) 
<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmintdev/111/111.pdf > last accessed 
24/4/2017 
33 (no31) 
34 ibid  
35 Oxfam 'An Economy For the 1%' (18 January 2016) 
<https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/bp210-economy-one-percent-tax-
havens-180116-summ-en_0.pdf > last accessed 6/4/2017 
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Development Committee, Stern implied that Bermuda, along with other OTs, inflicts 
considerable damage upon those in the developing world: 
 
“Almost a third (30%) of rich Africans’ wealth—a total of $500bn—is held offshore 
in tax havens. It is estimated that this costs African countries $14bn a year in lost tax 
revenues. This is enough money to pay for healthcare that could save the lives of 4 
million children and employ enough teachers to get every African child into school”36 
Citing the previously discussed Panama papers, Stern stated that the scandal 
“revealed to the world very clearly the connection between offshore financial 
operators, shell companies, and secrecy”37. Of equal importance is NGO involvement 
in matters of tax transparency as hinted in subsection 1.1.  In their 2016 'Tax Battles' 
report, Oxfam named Bermuda as the world's worst tax haven. The impact of such 
public lobbying is not only damaging to Bermuda’s reputation, but also extremely 
influential in both the House of Commons and Lords as evidenced in Stern’s 
reference to previous Oxfam reports. NGOs including Oxfam and ChristianAid have 
been particularly aggressive in their stance towards the OTs, believing that 
“[a]llowing our Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies to operate as tax 
havens undermines Britain's efforts to be an outward-facing, responsible member of 
the international community. It's time to end this embarrassing contradiction in our 
own backyard." 38 This further speaks to the distinctly moral motivation behind 
proposed amendment 167, in which a set of British lawmakers perceive the potential 
legal imposition as justified on moral grounds. This will become of particular 	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37 (no31)  
38 Oxfam 'Bermuda named world's worst tax haven' (12 December 2016) 
<http://www.oxfam.org.uk/media-centre/press-releases/2016/12/bermuda-named-worlds-worst-tax-
haven > last accessed 3/3/2017 
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relevance to this study in upcoming section 2.3, where academic thought surrounding 
tax morality will be explored in relation to this matter. 
 
 Interestingly, the Crown Dependencies and Gibraltar, whom are also financial 
centres, are excluded from Stern’s proposal. Reason for the exclusion of CDs was 
cited by the Baroness as consitituional complexity.39 Further to this, Gibraltar’s 
“unique status”40 was recognised. This special exception was also reiterated in the 
House of Lords during debate surrounding  a previously mentioned proposal similar 
to Stern’s, in which Conservative MP  Robert Neill stated that Gibraltar should not be 
‘lumped in’ with other OTs due to the jursidiction’s unique consitution aswell as it 
being subject to EU standards.41 As this research unfolds, it will become increasingly 
apparent that Bermuda’s legislative framework and consitution also provide for 
special status in terms of amendment 167 as enjoyed by Gibraltar. 
 
2.2.1 Legality of such a Proposal 
 
It is no far reach to perceive the proposed use of Order in Council to 
implement PRBO in Bermuda and other OTs as a legally extreme measure. 
Controversy surrounding such a measure is considerable as the UK legislating for 
law-abiding, self-governing territories must be fully justified. Stern echoed this, as 
she recognised “it is not ideal for the Government to have to make threats of using 
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Orders in Council. It would be infinitely preferable if the Orders in Council did not 
have to be used…”42 
 
Her Majesty makes Orders in Council, whose use is provided for in proposed 
amendment 167, with advice of the Privy Council.43 Orders in Council legislating for 
the BOTs are made under either an Act of Parliament or in exercise of the Royal 
prerogative. In the proposed amendment, an Order in Council would be waged as a 
tool under powers conferred by the Criminal Finances Act 2017. This would utilise 
such legal power to legislate in Bermuda for the specified purpose of company 
ownership transparency. This reservation of power for the UK is present in many OT 
constitutions, including Cayman and BVI by which power to legislate via Order in 
Council is permitted for the peace, order, and good governance of the OT in question. 
 
The power to legislate for OTs can also be found in British legislation. Section 
2 and 3 of the British Settlements Acts 1887 and 194544 reiterate such a legal ability. 
Section 2 permits Her Majesty by Order in Council to impose legislation perceived to 
be essential for the peace, order and good government of “…Her Majesty’s subjects 
and others within any British Settlement.”45 Section 3 “provides that notwithstanding 
any delegation of Her Majesty’s powers under the Acts to any local person or 
authority, Her Majesty may exercise all or any of the powers under the Acts.”46 These 
sections lead to confusion surrounding whether or not the express reservation of 
power found within OT constitutions is absolutely necessary. In modern trends 	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43 Ian Hendry et al, 'British Overseas Territories Law' (21 March 2011) 57 
 
44  British Settlements Act 1887  
45 (no43) 16  
46 ibid  
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whereby there is an observable distancing from colonialism, it can be expected that a 
self-governing territory’s constitution are to hold immense legal weight and is to be 
respected first and foremost. Provisions regarding such powers for the Crown in direct 
relation to the Constitution of Bermuda will be analysed in subsection 3.1.2 of this 
work.  
 
Orders in Council have previously been utilised on matters directly pertaining 
to morality and human rights. This was expressed by Baroness Williams of Trafford 
in the Second Reading of the Criminal Finances Bill, in which she stated that “[w]e 
have the power to legislate for the [OTs]…but we do so almost always with consent. 
Where we do not, it is on moral and human rights issues, such as homosexuality and 
the death penalty. However, just because we can…does not mean that we should do 
so when we are working with them…on a consensual basis.”47 Not only does this 
display the limited scope in which these powers are exercised, but also the explicit 
hesitancy on part of the UK of doing so. This is a further testament to the controversy 
such powers have the potential to cause; so much so that the UK government is 
hesitant in their utilisation. Academics have also noted the controversial nature of the 
use of Orders in Council, noting the UK government’s “…reluctance to do this 
because of the controversy they cause”.48 As Williams stated, Orders in Council have 
previously been used in relation to capital punishment and the illegality of 
homosexuality. In 2001, despite controversy, an Order in Council was passed forcing 
OTs to decriminalise homosexual acts between consenting adults in private.49 It is 
important to note that the matter of the legalisation of homosexuality, along with the 
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abolition of capital punishment, are matters far removed from company ownership 
transparency. The former directly relate to human rights issues, while the latter relates 
to Britain’s quest for increased transparency. Though Baroness Stern argues for the 
introduction of a public beneficial ownership register on moral grounds, it will 
become evident in the development of this research that the moral argument in 
relation to Bermuda is insufficient to justify use of Order in Council, especially in 
relation to previous instances whereby such legal means were utilised. 
 
In legislating for OTs, the UK walks a very fine line. It is logical to infer that 
the Crown may prefer the interests of the United Kingdom despite the potential for 
UK interests to directly conflict with those of the territory, specifically in this case 
Bermuda. In order to assess the justification for the use of Order in Council to matters 
pertaining to company ownership transparency, it is important to fully comprehend 
the matter of imposition; a public register of beneficial ownership. The following 
section will explore the importance and motivations of, as well as arguments for and 
against, public registers of beneficial ownership in order to build comprehensive 
understanding of amendment 167. This will enable us to accurately assess Bermuda’s 
case in the face of such a proposal. 
 
2.3 Public Registers of Beneficial Ownership 
 
  Companies and other forms of corporate vehicles play a legitimate, and 
vital role in the global economy. They can, however be misused for illegitimate and 
criminal purposes. FATF describes corporate vehicles as being used for money 
laundering (ML), tax fraud, terrorist financing, bribery, corruption, and insider 
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dealings.50 Criminals attempting to thwart anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-
terrorist financing (CFT) misuse corporate vehicles as a means to launder proceeds of 
criminal activity.51 In order to bypass regulations, organised criminals and terrorist 
financiers rely on financial secrecy. For this reason, untraceable shell companies have 
become an important means to mask and convert criminal proceeds before 
reintroduction into the financial system: “[f]or criminals moving large sums of dirty 
money internationally, there is no better device than an untraceable shell company.”52 
Shell companies, in brief terms, are incorporated yet typically have no assets or 
significant functioning.  Arranged so they cannot be linked back to individuals with 
significant control, authorities and law enforcement face an impenetrable corporate 
veil. In recognising the opportunities presented to criminals through the misuse of 
shell companies, multilateral organisations including FATF have responded by 
introducing new and increased transparency standards, especially in regards to 
beneficial ownership. 
 
Beneficial ownership, as defined by FATF, “…refers to the natural person(s) who 
ultimately owns or controls a customer and/or the natural person on whose behalf a 
transaction is being conducted. It also includes those persons who exercise ultimate 
effective control over a legal person or arrangement.53  
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Amendment 167 as proposed can be observed as stemming from standards 
outlined by FATF. The FATF Recommendations54 require details regarding the 
beneficial ownership of corporate vehicles to be accurate, adequate, and accessible by 
relevant authorities in a “timely fashion”55 These standards are intended to hinder the 
misuse of shell companies and other corporate formations. Shell companies, complex 
ownership and control structures, and the use of bearer shares amongst others are 
believed to obscure the true identity of beneficial owners. When beneficial ownership 
information is inaccurate, difficult to attain, or non-existent, FATF describes the 
impact as aiding criminals to disguise their identity, the true purpose of accounts or 
assets held by a corporate vehicle, and/or their origin.56  
 
 These standards have recently evolved and culminated into the Anti-
Corruption summit of May 2016, a clear continuing trend established in the 
previously discussed 2013 G8, in which countries publicly committed to the 
establishment of a public register of beneficial ownership under the summit’s theme 
of increased transparency. Directly after the summit, just six countries were reported 
as having committed to creating PRBOs, including the UK, Afghanistan, Kenya, 
France, the Netherlands and Nigeria57 (though that number has since gradually 
grown). While the summit was criticized for having minimal impact, 29 countries 
committed to the collection and sharing of beneficial ownership information between 
governments (though not publicly).  Bermuda was included in this agreement.  
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Australia, New Zealand, Jordan, Indonesia, Ireland, and Georgia all considered 
moving toward public registers; merely committing to “exploring the possibility”.58  
 
 Other countries however have previously outright rejected notions of public 
registries. In July 2016, France argued that the public nature of the proposed registry 
was unconstitutional as it directly infringes upon the right to privacy as set out by 
Article 2 of Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 178959. The 
Constitutional council later confirmed the publicity of the register to be a 
constitutional violation. This raises questions surrounding the legitimacy of an 
imposition of public registers in direct relation to the Bermuda constitution, addressed 
in chapter three of this work. Also of particular relevance is the US reluctance to 
adopt such a PRBO. The US did not commit to share registers of beneficial 
ownership, with David Cameron stating he “would keep pushing the Americans to be 
more accountable."60 Lord Naseby expressed frustration at the US unwillingness to 
waiver: "...the tragedy...is that somehow... we in the [UK] ...have never managed to 
persuade the [US]...to have a central, non-public register...they do not even have a 
central beneficial ownership register."61 As Bermuda’s biggest trading partner, this 
undoubtedly influences Bermuda’s predicament as later explored in chapter 3.  
 
2.3.1 Importance of Beneficial Ownership Information 
 
As previously discussed, criminals operate using complex chains of 
companies and other entities in order to conceal their identities and distance 	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61 HL Deb 25 April 2017, vol 782, col 1324  
	   27 
themselves from their crimes. These crimes include corruption, terrorist financing, 
sanctions evasion, money laundering and tax evasion. They specifically operate these 
chains across multiple jurisdictions in order to exploit secrecy laws and insufficient 
and incomplete mechanisms for information exchange. Finding out the true identity of 
those who really own and control corporate vehicles is therefore a very real obstacle 
for relevant authorities and law enforcement 
.  
It is increasingly clear that a fragmented system, where information is not 
freely shared between jurisdictions, is no longer admissible in a world where cross-
border investigations to tackle all forms of illicit finance have become commonplace. 
Largely, unless jurisdictions have a comprehensive public register of beneficial 
ownership, this information can only be accessed through exchange of information on 
request. The issue presented here is that the investigators must already know a certain 
level of detail. If investigators do not know the name of the company and jurisdiction 
of incorporation, it is nearly impossible to uncover whether or not a specific 
individual is linked to a corporate vehicle. This is further exacerbated by the fact that 
investigators are unable to request ownership information from all countries at once. 
This can cause severe delays in the process of investigation, also severely limiting 
investigator’s ability to tailor a particular strategy to the prevention of financial crime. 
In order for law enforcement to unravel the complex cross-border chains used by 
criminals, including terrorists, access to wider beneficial ownership information is 
therefore essential. Providing public access to beneficial ownership registries has been 
argued to be key in this regard. Though this has been addressed through the 
agreement of automatic exchange of beneficial ownership elaborated later in this 
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work (to which Bermuda is a signatory), the obstacles to justice presented above serve 
to convey the importance of such information. 
 
“Transparency [has become] the new buzzword in private wealth circles.” 
Transparency initivates , as previously discussed, evolve regularly and emanate from 
the OECD, EU, and often UK government. Unsurprisingly, with increased 
transparency comes the loss of privacy for all, “including those who comply 
scrupulously with their tax and other obligations.”62 The proposed creation of public 
registers is one way in which transparency of information, and more specifically 
ownership information, has legislatively manifested. 
 
2.3.2 Objectives of a Public Register 
 
A public register of beneficial ownership is a clear step up from the timely 
exchange of information between governments. The United Kingdom desires central 
registries of beneficial ownership to be compiled in a digital database and searchable 
free of charge. This publicly accessible register should contain beneficial ownership 
information regarding companies and limited liability partnerships while being 
searchable by both corporate entity and individual identity. This forms the basis of a 
new ‘gold standard’ surrounding ownership transparency.63  
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The objectives of such a standard are clearly defined in the face of the 
previously discussed threat of misuse of corporate vehicles (‘shell companies’) to 
mask criminal proceeds and evade taxes rightfully payable. FATF explicitly states its 
standards surrounding ownership transparency are an attempt to “prevent misuse of 
corporate vehicles…[but also]…support the efforts to prevent and detect other 
designated categories of offences such as tax crimes and corruption”64 
 
A publicly accessible register is perceived to alleviate some of the ills of 
information exchange previously discussed. Investigators will no longer need to know 
a certain level of information in order to request information imperative to the 
prosecution of cross-border financial crimes, specifically regarding tax evasion. In 
addition to this, time delays that may negatively impact the strategy and outcome of 
investigations into illicit finance are avoided, as the public registers will be freely 




Arguments surrounding such a public register as proposed in Amendment 167 
have surfaced both for and against the proposition. In favour of such an amendment, 
practitioners and lawmakers alike argue that reducing the means by which criminals 
can mask and hide ‘dirty money’ is a key dimension to the governmental role in the 
global quest for transparency. In line with this notion, public registries have become 
increasingly popular, with the UK, Norway, and the Netherlands (amongst others 
previously listed) committing to developing registers and publishing their contents.  	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While arguments in favour of open registers have been touched upon in 
previous sections, public registers which rely on self-declaration are also found to be 
inexpensive to operate, with agency fees low for countries who already have a digital 
register: “…[I]t essentially involves adding a few extra fields to an existing form.”65 
Registers of this nature are praised for offering universal, unrestricted, and immediate 
access to information vital to holding the powerful to account, by providing for 
“many eyes” to scrutinise contained data.66  
 
Baroness Meacher, speaking during the 2nd day of the Criminal Finances Bill 
Committee in the House of Lords, supported Baroness Stern’s proposed amendment, 
stating that  
 
“…the Government have already accepted that in order to properly tackle corruption, 
this information must be open to public scrutiny. Journalists, NGOs and the public 
must be able to examine the information, not just for us in the UK but also for those 
developing countries which suffer most from corruption and need access to the 
information the most.”67 
 
Baroness Kramer, during the same debate, echoed support for the public availability 
of such information: “I have found no one who believes it is true that enforcement 
authorities would be able to act through those central registries in ways sufficient to 
close down the routes and effectively shut out so many of the people who we think 	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should be shut out from the legitimate financial world. The only route I can see to 
make this reasonably…effective is transparency.”68 In line with this, it is believed that 
“law enforcement, civil society and journalists could use [a public register] to uncover 
wrongdoing.”69 
 
Despite considerable support for such an amendment, it is also evident that 
there are legitimate arguments against its effectiveness. Practitioners, lawmakers, and 
surprisingly multilateral organisations and law enforcement agencies alike have all 
expressed scepticism regarding such an extreme legislative proposal. Lord Leigh of 
Hurley best put this forward during the same Criminal Finances Bill Committee 
debate, in which he described how law enforcement agencies and multilateral 
organisations do not support public registers. David Lewis “formerly of the National 
Crime Agency (NCA) and now heading…FATF”70 told the Commonwealth anti-
corruption summit that “incomplete, unverified, out of date information in a public 
register is not as useful as law enforcement agencies being able to access the right 
information at the point they need it.”71 Public registers have also been criticised in 
writing, for simply being too simplistic of a solution to such a multidimensional issue. 
Registers of this nature, as proposed by Baroness Stern, fail to assess the quality of 
information filed into it. This perpetuates tax authority and law enforcement barriers 
to information, as they cannot be sure the information they have unrestricted access to 
is indeed accurate to the date of searching. This has the potential to create an illusion 
of regulatory security by encouraging AML and CFT processes to be dependent upon 	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unverified information. In addition to this, those in opposition of such a register have 
cited potential impacts on privacy; “…it may not always be best to opt for maximum 
financial transparency since it infringes on the privacy of individuals and commercial 
confidentiality.”72 Privacy is a human right, as stipulated in Article 12 of the United 
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.73 This is also acknowledged in the 
European Convention on Human Rights 195074, which also sets out the right to 
privacy in Article 8. This sees proposed Amendment 167 with the potential to infringe 
upon fundamental human rights in self-governing territories via legal imposition. In 
addition to this, corporate confidentially has been described as “important to allow 
businesses to gather information, to make decisions and undertake negotiations and to 
work on ideas and innovations before they launch them.”75 
 
Perhaps more surprising is the OECD stance on public registers. OECD 
Secretary-General Angel Gurria stated, "a proliferation of different standards is in 
nobody's interest." The multilateral organisations holds that for taxpayers to fulfil 
their tax obligation, they “need to have confidence that the often sensitive financial 
information is not disclosed inappropriately”76 The fear of the inappropriate disclosure 
of extremely personal financial details is further found in lawmaker concerns: “the 
potential for kidnap of innocent very rich people with large balances held in our 
overseas territories needs consideration. Clearly, none of us would want to create a 
system which would increase the risk of kidnap.”77 Further to this, it is also argued 
that public registers have the potential to “counterintuitively reduce the transparency 	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of activities being undertaken in the UK and negatively impact fee revenue generation 
from UK incorporate companies.”78 This is made possible because criminals may file 
invalid information (as discussed) or may simply undertake activities via a non-UK 
company, pushing crime further out of reach of enforcement authorities. In addition to 
this, law-abiding citizens involved in business who value privacy may also choose to 
undertake activity in a non-UK incorporated company, “…decreas[ing] the number of 
UK incorporate companies, and therefore fee income for Companies House.”79 
 
But where does the demand for transparency end? How does one measure the 
impact of public registers vs. central registers accessible by relevant authorities? How 
does the public listing of beneficial ownership information fit into long-standing 
privacy rights? It would appear that when looked at closely, the matter of Amendment 
167’s position provides more questions than answers. The effectiveness of such a 
mechanism is not known for sure, and is fiercely debated in relevant literature: 
“transparency can become a hamster wheel; you can always ask for more detailed and 
widespread disclosures without moving closer to the ultimate goal of more responsive 
public institutions, more effective markets and a stronger social contract between 
governments and their people.”80 
 
Despite valid arguments from both sides of the fence, what matters is that 
British lawmakers find public registers of beneficial ownership valuable enough to 
threaten legal imposition upon Bermuda. This subsection has analysed the arguments 	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for and against public registers to build fuller comprehension of the matter under 
scrutiny. In order to assess Bermuda’s standing in the face of such an imposition, it is 
vital to understand the strengths, weaknesses, and theories surrounding the matter of 
imposition. It is also imperative to this work to analyse the UK’s own registry. This 
will enable the reader to assess Bermuda’s standing with the imposing nation, lending 
clarity to the wider justification of such a proposal as addressed in the fourth chapter 




2.3.4 UK’s Own Beneficial Ownership Registry 
 
A public register of beneficial ownership is an extremely recent development 
in the UK’s legal framework for ownership transparency. Prior to the steps discussed 
in this subsection, the UK did not hold a central register of beneficial ownership. 
Unfamiliar with the mechanism but displaying an express willingness to adopt such a 
measure, the UK government introduced provisions concerning heightened 
transparency as part of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 201581 
(section 7). Section 81 and schedule 3 are intended to amend the previous Companies 
Act 200682, requiring companies to keep a register of “people who have significant 
control over the company”83 often known as persons with significant control (PSCs) 
or beneficial owners.  
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The legislation above has provided for the establishment of a comprehensive central 
register of beneficial owners to be stored and maintained by Companies House. The 
register will, of course, be publicly accessible and contain information directly 
regarding companies, limited liability partnerships, and Societates Europaeae 
incorporated in the UK84. The database will be digital, available online and searchable 
free of charge by “both name of corporate entity and name of individual.”85 It is 
stipulated that under certain exceptional circumstances, beneficial ownership 
information will be suppressed from the public register: “Approximately 30 beneficial 
owners have been successfully granted the right to keep their name off the register 
due to concerns about their security.”86 Despite this, both public and non-public 
information regarding beneficial owners will be accessible by UK relevant authorities.  
 
Through this, companies were now required to register beneficial owners from 
6 April 2016. This data regarding the owners was to be declared to Companies House 
from 30 June 2016 alongside the company’s annual statement. In line with this, the 
Companies House register is expected to be complete by 29 June 2017.87  
 
Due to standards mandated above, companies will be required to:88 
 
1. Identify the people with significant control (PSCs) over the company and confirm 
their information (see paragraph 9); 
 
2. Record the details of the PSC on the company’s own PSC register; 	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3. Provide this information to Companies House as part of the annual Confirmation 
Statement (formerly the Annual Return); and 
 
4. Update the information on the company’s own PSC register when it changes, and 
update the information at Companies House when the next Confirmation Statement is 
made. 
 
Note that the information contained within the register relies upon self-
reporting which alludes to previously discussed concerns: “Criminals can be expected 
to conceal their interests.”89 In addition to this, also note that companies are required 
to file information with Companies House on an annual basis as part of their 
Confirmation Statement. This in turn means that the register is updated a mere once a 
year, with the potential of being multiple months out of date as ownership structures 
change with being sold or transferred. This further alludes to the previously discussed 
concern of accurate information stemming from the NCA, by which data contained 
within the register was feared destined to be incomplete, unverified, and inaccurate. 
 
In identifying persons with significant control (beneficial owners), three broad 
conditions are presented90: 
 
1. An individual who holds more than 25% of shares in the company. 
 
2. An individual who holds more than 25% of voting rights in the company. 	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3. An individual who holds the right to appoint or remove the majority of the 
board of directors of the company. 
 
The condition stipulated by the UK government are in line with the standards 
emanating from FATF and further specified by the EU’s third and fourth AML 
Directives, utilising the figure of 25% to assess someone’s true and ultimate 
ownership of a corporate vehicle. This is quite a high threshold as evidenced in 
relation to Bermuda, and may give criminals room to arrange their affairs in a way as 
to avoid reaching such a condition. 
 
It is plain to see in this section that the UK’s public register is not perfect. Though 
a commendable step forward in ownership transparency, little definitive analysis of 
the new register has been undertaken due to its extremely recent implementation. This 
new feature of the UK’s beneficial ownership legislative framework must be tried and 
tested in order to fully gauge the effectiveness and therefore worth of such a measure. 
NGO Global Witness appears to be the first to attempt such analysis, though severely 
lacking in depth. In their study, they found considerable discrepancies in register data: 
"you can write anything in the nationality field and we found over 500 ways of 
putting 'British', including ten people who wrote 'Cornish'."91 The Global witness 
study uncovered further discrepancies: “2,160 beneficial owners born in 2016. Now 
either these are a very precocious bunch of toddlers or the data has been entered 
incorrectly.”92 Further to this it was found that 
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“[j]ust under ten percent of companies…have no beneficial owner. This is 
possible…because you have to own at least  25 percent of a company to be considered 
its beneficial owner…that’s quite a high threshold, which could be exploited by 
people looking to stay under the radar.”93 
 
This displays observed problems concerning the 25% threshold, mandated by the 
EU and observed by the UK as hinted above. 
 
  2.4 Chapter Conclusion 
 
 
Through comprehension of specific features of Britain’s recent propulsion 
toward transparency we are better able to more fully assess the case of Bermuda in the 
face of Baroness Stern’s proposed legal imposition. Context surrounding the Criminal 
Finances Act 2017 was put forward, with the focus of this work- Amendment 167- 
focused upon. The motivations and political discourse surrounding the proposal have 
been analysed to lend understanding of the exact nature of the amendment. It was 
found that the amendment was tabled on distinctly moral grounds. This is directly 
relevant to the legality of the amendment, serving as the foundation to lawmaker 
arguments that an Order in Council to impose a public register upon Bermuda is 
necessary and justified. In addition to this, constitutional and legislative provisions 
providing for Crown legislative power in the OTs was compiled. While it was found 
that provision for these powers could be found in territory constituions and British 
law, the notion that the constituions of self-governing nations should be considered 
first and foremost above seemingly colonial British legislation. The matter of 
imposition- public registries- came under scrutiny as the importance, objectives, 
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arguments for and against, and the UK’s own register were analysed. It was found 
that while beneficial ownerhsip information is recognised to be important, there was a 
plethora of arguments against making public of such information. It was also found 
that while the UK has taken an important step forward in their transparency agenda, 
their register has been observed to have concerning flaws in its infancy. These include 
the inaccuracy of contained information, as well as the possibility for criminals to 
potentially arrange their affairs in a way as to avoid the high 25% criteria of 
ownership. 
 
The discussion undertaken in this chapter is vital to this research project. The data 
contained in this chapter, along with the following chapter, will enable us to 
undertake an accurate, contextual, and legislatively-aware analysis of the forceful 
introduction of a public register in Bermuda. To this end, the following chapter 3 will 
put forth the case of Bermuda. 
 
 
Chapter III: Bermuda; Building a Perspective 
 
3.1 Bermuda: A Unique Case 
 
As the research process for this work developed, Bermuda clearly emerged as an 
exceptional and unique case. Bermuda, the oldest of the UK territories, differs from 
other OTs in geographical location, population, development, affluence, industry, 
constitution, and legal framework (specifically regarding beneficial ownership 
information). Bermuda is often lumped in with Cayman and BVI as a ‘prominent 
Caribbean tax haven’ however is in fact not in the Caribbean, but the Mid-Atlantic: 
“Settled in 1609 by shipwrecked colonists en route from England to Virginia, 
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Bermuda has long represented a Mid-Atlantic waypoint between England and 
America.”94 Bermuda, with 70,19695 residents, is the largest OT in population and 
surpasses second largest Cayman by over 10,000. Also one of the most developed 
OTs, Bermuda does not rely on foreign development funding. The affluence of the 
island is statistically observable: “Bermuda, as of 2016, had the fourth highest per 
capita income in the world, about 70% higher than the US."96 Bermuda’s primary 
international business functions are insurance and reinsurance, in stark contrast to 
previously mentioned Caribbean OTs.  Bermuda’s constitution differs from other OTs 
in its relationship with the Crown, enjoying the one of the highest degrees of self-
governance with limited colonial interference. Bermuda, most importantly to this 
piece, also differs from its Caribbean siblings in its beneficial ownership regime: it 
has maintained a registry for 70 years. 
 
Despite these considerable differences and overall uniqueness, Bermuda’s 
offshore financial services industry has suffered reputational damage from “an 
unfortunate kind of guilt by association with less scrupulous jurisdictions.”97 This has 
been a reality for Bermuda since the acceleration of international business in the late 
1980s: “The island’s name has, at times, been in danger of becoming a 
synonym for “tax haven”, a byword for sleaze and international financial 
crime.”98 This unjust association has seen Bermuda become the subject of highly-
emotive attacks on the island’s perceived lack of regulation: “one of the key economic 
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planks in US Secretary of State John Kerry’s ill-fated 2004 presidential campaign was 
directed specifically at Bermuda.”99 Arianna Huffington, launching a citizen-activist 
campaign entitled 'The Bermuda Project', aimed to abolish the island's propensity for 
international business because she believed "big corporations are abandoning our 
country and setting up phony tax shelters in the sands of Bermuda.”100 Most recently, 
Jeremy Corbyn “no distinction whatsoever between Bermuda and other, more laxly 
regulated British Overseas Territories that operate offshore financial services 
industries”101 as he argued that the UK “should impose direct rule”102 upon the islands 
in matters regarding tax transparency. 
 
This chapter intends to bring legislative analysis to political and public 
discourse by putting forth the case for Bermuda’s exceptional treatment in regards to 
Amendment 167, as is the case with Gibraltar mentioned in section 2.2 of this work. 
This will unfold through analysis of Bermuda’s financial centre, constitution, and 
international standing as differences between Bermuda and the other OTs are 
highlighted. Bermuda’s current regime of the collection of beneficial ownership 
information will be detailed through the presentation of extensive legislative research, 
as well as Bermuda’s bilateral and multilateral commitments. This will assist the 
reader in understanding Bermuda’s willingness to adhere to international transparency 
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standards, dispelling misconceptions that the island is a jurisdiction shrouded in 
secrecy and steeped in suspicion.  
 
3.1.1   Financial Sector 
 
As previously noted, the financial centre of Bermuda - unlike its commonly 
associated partners Cayman and BVI - does not rely on the “more buccaneering world 
of banking”103. Nor is it reliant on tax avoidance strategies by MNCs and individuals. 
Bermuda is often referred to as the “world’s risk capital”, as the government has 
fostered the steady growth of the industry.104 Bermuda surfaced as the leader in the 
development and regulation of captive insurers an astounding 40 years ago: “today it 
is the home of underwriting operations for more than 30 major international insurance 
and reinsurance firms.”105 Due to the worldwide need for greater access to property 
and casualty (re)insurance, Bermuda has witnessed an insurance boom; especially in 
the last 20 years. These immense insurance firms “are regulated under a separate and 
distinct set of requirements with [regulation] designed to meet international regulatory 
standards commensurate with their size and market scope.”106 
 
This has seen Bermuda’s affluence steadily increase. Little known to those off 
island and not in the insurance industry, Bermuda is now the “largest supplier of 
catastrophe reinsurance to US insurers”107: 
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“Bermuda’s insurers and reinsurers have contributed an estimated $35 billion in 
catastrophe claims payments to their US clients, including $2.5 billion in response to 
the World Trade Centre tragedy, $17 billion for Hurricane Katrina and $2 billion 
following tornado outbreaks from 2010 to 2012. This amount now also includes the 
estimated $3 billion in reported losses by Bermuda’s reinsurers for Hurricane 
Sandy.”108 
 
As illustrated through statistics present above, the United States, a country that 
has been particularly unwilling to adopt public beneficial ownership registers, is 
Bermuda’s largest trading partner: the island "remains closely linked to the [US] 
economically. Indeed, the Bermudian dollar is pegged (1:1) to the US dollar." 109 A 
World Economic Impact Report published by the Government of Bermuda found that 
“Bermuda in many ways is a more significant economic partner for the United States 
than Canada, UK, Japan and China.”110 The relavance of this trade dynamic in terms 
of Amendment 167 will be expanded upon in the next chapter. 
 
Bermuda’s success does not, however, solely benefit the US. The UK also 
benefits from Bermuda’s financial centre. In a letter response111 to Jeremy Corbyn’s 
demands to impose direct rule over the island, Premier Michael Dunkley outlined 
these benefits. It was found that Bermuda’s economy directly ccontributes “53,000 
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United Kingdom selling…financial services to UK persons. [Further] some 15,200 
UK jobs dedicated to producing and exporting services to Bermuda.”112 The island 
also provides 10 billion dollars of capital to the UK economy since 2008; Bermuda is 
the UK’s third largest-non European investor. In addition to this, Bermuda is found to 
be one of the largest providers of reinsurance to cover UK terorism. In addition to the 
above, Bermuda is key to Lloyds of London, providing: “26% of Lloyd’s 2013 
capacity and wrote 23% of Lloyd’s premium – almost $10.0 billion additional 
capacity”113 Preliminary analysis of this data points to Bermuda as a key economic 
partner to both the UK and the US; not an adversary.  
 
Bermuda is an economic power unto itself. It has its own world-class 
multinationals that make independent economic decisions and is a driving force for 
rebuilding post-catastrophe globally, as evidenced in the instances below: 
 
• Bermuda insurance carriers covered $.6 billion reported losses for French 
homeowners in 2009 from Windstorm Klaus. 30% of losses paid by Bermuda.  
 
• Bermuda covered 37% of reported losses in Europe from Windstorm Xynthia.  
 
• Bermuda insurers covered 55% of the 2009 Air France Crash liability - $222 
million.  
 
• Bermuda insurers covered 50% of insured losses for Cruise ship Costa 
Concordia - $500 million of $1.0 billion reported losses. 	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• Bermuda insurance carriers paid 51% of reported liabilities from 2010 New 
Zealand earthquake. 
 
• · Bermuda insurance carriers paid 29% of reported liabilities for the 
international share of Japan’s 2011 earthquake.114 
 
As the Panama Papers, and more specifically the use of shell companies, was 
found to be the main driving force behind Amendment 167, it is imperative to assess 
Bermuda’s standing in light of such revelations. Bermuda, simply, does not facilitate 
nor encourage the use of shell corporations to evade taxes owed to major nations such 
as the UK. Bermuda Governmental research indicates that: 
 
“Bermuda constitutes only 2% of the corporate registrations in the jurisdictions that 
comprise the leading British Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories. 
Bermuda’s total is 15,600 compared with 100,000 in the Cayman Islands and nearly 
500,000 in the British Virgin Islands. Note, this compares to 1,100,000 in 
Delaware.”115  
  
The specific reasoning for the distinct lack of shell companies comparatively 
in Bermuda will become apparent in section 3.2 of this piece. Bermuda continually 
updates beneficial ownership information, and is extremely cooperative in the 
intergovernmental sharing of such information. Preliminary analysis of the data 	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presented by the Government of Bermuda points towards the notion that Bermuda, in 
sharp contrast from Cayman and BVI, is not an appropriate jurisdiction to target via 
Amendment 167. 
 
Of further relevance is Bermuda’s intention to distance itself from the world 
of banking, unlike Cayman and BVI. Not a banking domicile for private banks, 
Bermuda has just four commercial banks:  
 
“Bank of Bermuda is a subsidiary of the international HSBC bank. Butterfield Bank 
fulfills the functions of a super-regional bank, with subsidiary and affiliated 
operations in 15 countries around the world. Bermuda Commercial Bank handles 
only international business transactions. Capital G is a community bank and high-
level financial advisor.”116 
 
In addition to this distinct lack of questionable banking practices, “Bermuda 
has never been a bank secrecy jurisdiction”, implementing Basel III banking 
regulatory requirements in 2015.117 There are no laws in Bermuda providing for bank 
secrecy. 
 
As Bermuda is often accused by the UK of offered tax incentives to MNCs 
looking to stash profits, the taxation system in which their financial centre operates is 
also of relevance. Bermuda has no corporate or capital gains taxes, and income-based 
taxes are limited to a payroll tax of 14% on a tranche of income earned on the island". 
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In addition to this, Bermuda imposes duties on imports whilst also legislating a 
variety consumption-based and real estate taxes.118 While academics have accused 
Bermuda of attracting international business by “"compet[ing] aggressively in 
taxation"119, this is harshly refuted by the Bermuda government: 
 
“Bermuda collects tax revenues equal to nearly 17% of its GDP. Bermuda’s tax 
system is based on consumption taxes with an additional large contribution from a 
payroll tax paid by employers on incomes earned by employees. Bermuda has not 
adopted tax laws intended to attract corporation formation, rather its 100 years plus 
system of consumption tax has served it well in financing its government. Analogous 
to many business structures, Bermuda’s tax laws and treaty commitments avoid 
double taxation of corporations and facilitate taxation of income accruing to the 
beneficial owners outside of Bermuda. Its commitment is to be at the forefront of 
transparency and cooperation by helping other jurisdictions claim revenue they 
believe their taxpayers are obligated to pay.”120 
 
The above indicates that although Bermuda does not tax in a conventional 
manner, it has its own historical system of taxation that works for the jurisdiction. 
While the tax environment created by this unique system is no doubt attractive to 
corporations, it is not the sole benefit Bermuda provides to potential companies: 
"Bermudians have long been aware of the substantial advantages that their 
geographic, cultural, and historical proximity to major north-Atlantic powers 
provide."121 Companies are attracted by Bermuda’s economic and social stability, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 (no94)  
119 ibid  
120 (no115)  
121 (no94)  
	   48 
friendliness to e-commerce, daily flights to Europe and the US, investment flexibility, 
progressive legislation, and a sophisticated workforce, among others.122 
 
Through analysis of Bermuda’s international business industry and the 
taxation system it is bound by, it is clear that the island emerges as distinct to its 
Caribbean counterparts. Bermuda, a legitimate and legal financial centre, already 
appears to be misunderstood in public and political discourse. Lawmakers, as 
evidenced by Baroness Stern’s proposal, also appear to have fallen ignorant of 
Bermuda’s unique and robust industries, aversion to risky business, and unique 
taxation system. As this chapter continues, Bermuda further emerges as an 
exceptional case in Amendment 167 in terms of its constitution, collection of 
beneficial ownership information, and international commitments. 
 
 3.1.2   Constitutionally 
 
In addition to Bermuda’s exceptional international business centre, the 
island’s constitution also differs from the rest of the OTs in one very critical way. 
While the provision for the Crown ability to impose Orders in Council (thereby 
legislating for the OTs) can be found in many other OTs, there is no such provision in 
Bermuda’s constitution. For example, the Constitution of the Cayman Islands 
(Section 125)123 provides “There is reserved to Her Majesty full power to make laws 
for the peace, order and good government of the Cayman Islands.” This, when taken 
in the context of Amendment 167, provides legal explicit legal ability for the UK to 
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legislate for Cayman. “Similar reservations of power to legislate by Order in Council 
for the peace, order and good government of the territory are contained in the 
constitution Orders of all other territories [except Bermuda]…[including BVI and 
Gibraltar].”124 Bermuda sharply differs in this regard, as there is “…no general power 
to legislate by Order in Council for Bermuda” 125  as the constitution Order of 
Bermuda126 makes no provision for legislative power to Her Majesty. 
 
It is possible to argue that the Bermuda Constitution Act 1967127 does not 
explicitly deny legislative powers to her Majesty, as Section 1(1) contains: 
 
“Her Majesty may by Order in Council make such provisions as appears to Her 
expedient for the government of Bermuda.” 
 
However, as Hardy et al note in their book British Overseas Territories Law, 
these are extremely general terms. However, the full title of the 1967 Act is “An Act 
to provide for the grant of a new constitution for Bermuda”. This is best interpreted 
by concluding that the Act above does not indeed contain legislative powers to Her 
Majesty via Order in Council, as intended through Amendment 167 if Bermuda does 
not comply with the demand for a public register. “In practice, [this] interpretation has 
been consistently followed.”128 Unlike other OTs, most importantly Cayman and BVI, 
there is no power on behalf of the UK to legislate for the peace, order, and good 
government of Bermuda. While there are provisions in specific Acts of Bermuda 
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Parliament, these powers are specific to each act and defined for special purposes of 
the respective Acts.129 
 
Though quite simple to comprehend, the above difference between Bermuda 
and other OTs is critical to the purposes of this research project. How will lawmakers 
in the UK impose such legislation upon Bermuda if such powers do not expressly 
exist? Does this important distinction in Bermuda’s constitutional order not provide 
for exceptional treatment, as argued for Gibraltar in the House of Commons and 
Lords? It is clear to see from the above that the threat tabled by Baroness Stern 
towards Bermuda provides for the constitutional crisis of a self-governing territory. 
This critical flaw contained in the proposed amendment will be further discussed in 
the concluding chapter of this piece. 
 
3.2  Beneficial Ownership Registry: Current State of Affairs 
 
From the outset is important to note that Bermuda has collected beneficial 
ownership of corporate and legal entities for over 70 years (since 1939). Collection of 
this data “was driven by other statutory purposes, including for exchange control 
purposes and identification of owners of local companies”.130 No matter the purposes 
of such collection, the result is that Bermuda has procured a registry of beneficial 
ownership of companies formed on the island. This surpasses the international 
standard by far and places Bermuda ahead of most jurisdictions, many only having 
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recently committed to retention of such information as conveyed in chapter 2. This 
also further sets Bermuda apart from Cayman and BVI, who instead of committing to 
a central registry (as Bermuda already does), have insisted on “implementing—or 
wishing to implement—a complex system of linked registers.”131 
 
As agents of the Ministry of Finance, the Bermuda Monetary Authority 
(BMA) has been designated as the Controller of Foreign Exchange by the Exchange 
Control Act 1972132 and the Exchange Control Regulations 1973133. The BMA is 
therefore responsible for undertaking vetting and diligence oversight on beneficial 
owners of all entities seeking to register in Bermuda. This concerns all “persons 
wishing to hold shares, interests or voting rights in a Bermuda legal entity.”134 Entities 
included in this process consist of local companies, exempted companies, partnerships 
(exempted and limited), permit companies (overseas) and permit partnerships 
(overseas).135 
 
The Registrar of Companies (ROC) provides the BMA with the legal and 
beneficial ownership of all Bermuda companies for approval prior to their 
registration. Identity information on all owners in this full ownership chain must be 
disclosed to the BMA under Form 1 of the Company (forms) Rules 1982136. This 
information is filed on behalf of the companies by Corporate Registry Service 
Providers (CSP’s) who are registered with the BMA.  
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As part of this procedure, the identity information provided to the BMA gives 
details on direct, intermediate and ultimate owners, thereby looking through any 
‘corporate veil’, and if a trust structure, will include information on beneficiaries, 
trustees, and settlers of the trust(s). The identity information provided includes the 
name, address, and nationality (for natural persons) or place of incorporation (for 
legal persons). A CSP on behalf of the company submits electronically this 
information. The Corporate Service Provider Business Act 2012137 and its 2014 
Amendment138 heavily regulate these CSPs. CSPs are further regulated under the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2008139 Section 14. 
 
Subsequent to the incorporation of all companies, all issuances or transfers of 
equity shares (to or from non-residents as defined under the Exchange Control Act 
1972 and Regulations 1973) must be submitted to the BMA for prior 
approval/permission. In instances where a share of ownership reaches 10%, “the 
Authority vets the owners including the ultimate beneficial owners”140 This ensures 
the BMA’s ability to continually to track ownership data throughout the life of the 
company of any beneficial owners seeking 10% or more ownership in a Bermuda 
registered company. The application for permission may be made electronically or via 
post to the BMA. The Company may submit directly or by way of its agent who must 
be a CRP to access the Authority’s electronic filing system. 
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Additionally, since the amendment to the Exchange Control Regulations 
1973 141 in October 2012, Permit companies (foreign domiciled companies with 
permission to conduct business in or from within Bermuda) are required to the report 
to the Controller of Foreign Exchange the identity of persons who beneficially own 
10% or more of the share capital. 
 
Note that this threshold was previously 5%, but was re-established as 10% in 
2013.142 Even with the recent doubling of the threshold defining a beneficial owner, 
this is still a staggering 15% below the FATF and UK standard. This gives potential 
criminals less room to arrange their affairs in a way to avoid the threshold, previously 
explored as a flaw in the UK’s brand new register. In addition to this, the requirement 
to reassess the chain of beneficial ownership with each transfer is a far higher 
standard than the UK’s process of annual submission of information. Much can occur 
within company ownership in a year, and these sometimes complex transfers could be 
unaccounted for by the time of submission, while also rendering the UK register more 
inaccurate than Bermuda’s retained information. 
 
In terms of monitoring compliance, the Minister of Economic Development 
and the ROC as his agent have responsibility for overseeing compliance with the 
Companies Act 1981 143 . If concerns or complains regarding the register of 
shareholders arise, the Minister of Finance has the powers to inspect the state of the 
register under sections 110 and 132 of the Companies Act 1981.  	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In terms of enforcement, the BMA oversees compliance with the requirements 
of filing of information related to ownership of companies and partnerships by 
regulating the businesses of licensed financial institutions and in relation to 
AML/CFT obligations. It is an offence under the previously mentioned Exchange 
Control Act and Regulations to fail to obtain permission of the BMA to issue or 
transfer shares under regulations 50 and 51. For partnerships it is an offence under the 
Exempted partnerships Act 1992 (Section 13A)144 and the Limited Partnership Act 
1883 (Section 8B)145 for failure to obtain the consent of the Authority of any changes. 
Consequences may range from the dissolving of a partnership, court proceedings, and 
financial penalties. 
 
It is plain to see from the above that the current regime of beneficial 
ownership collection in Bermuda far surpasses international current state of affairs. 
The UK government has acknowledged this by recognising 
 
“that Bermuda has a long established central register of company beneficial 
ownership. The Bermuda Police Service has arrangements with law enforcement both 
internationally and the United Kingdom. Given Bermuda’s existing central register, 
there are no legislative arrangements required in order to provide information [in a 
more timely fashion].”146 
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While this acknowledgement is extremely telling and important, it appears that 
lawmakers in both Houses have either overlooked Bermuda’s unique standing, or 
have chosen to ignore it. 
 
3.3  International Standing	  
 
In addition to the island’s robust legal framework for the collection of 
beneficial ownership information, research has found that Bermuda has also displayed 
an observable commitment to international transparency standards that further attest 
to the jurisdiction’s legitimacy. A brief overview is as follows: 
 
The US Departments of Justice, State and the Treasury have testified to 
Bermuda’s standing as a cooperative partner, with two tax enforcement treaties with 
the US in existence. “Many federal and state agencies in the United States have hailed 
Bermuda’s government as a cooperative partner in many areas, including …  tax law 
enforcement.”147 
In addition to this, Bermuda has “40 bilateral Tax Information Exchange 
Agreements (TIEAs) with all nations whom comprise of major trading partners”148. A 
step further from this, Bermuda is a signatory to the Multilateral Convention on 
Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Information Matters. This multilateral TIEA 
furthers Bermuda’s position in international ownership transparency by facilitating 
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“tax exchange relationships with over 106 jurisdictions…including all member states 
of the G20 and EU.”149 
 
In addition to this, Bermuda has also signed onto the OECD Common Reporting 
Standards, which further facilitates the international sharing of financial information. 
Bermuda was also the first OT or Crown Dependency to agree to the OECD BEPS 
Country by Country Reporting for MNCs, leading the way for offshore financial 
centres in terms of transparency. 150 A commitment to cooperation with foreign law 
enforcement is further exemplified through the signing of an MOU with the National 
Crime Agency to further facilitate more expedient exchange of beneficial ownership 
(within 24 hours).151 
 
Finally, Bermuda has not been shy to publicly commit to steps to increase its 
international transparency with regards to ownership data:  
 
“On May 12 2016 at UK Prime Minister David Cameron’s Anti-Corruption Summit 
Bermuda was recognized as one of 33 jurisdictions that has committed to develop an 
international standard for the automatic sharing of beneficial ownership information 
with government officials” 
 
3.4  Chapter Conclusion 
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The above exploration of Bermuda’s unique positon in industry, consitution, 
beneficial ownership regime, and international standing enables the reader to fully 
assess Bermuda’s case in the face of Amendment 167. Bermuda has been clearly 
established as an exceptional case in comparison to other OTs, and in many ways is 
observably leading the way for the offshore world in international transparency 
efforts. The discussion undertaken above lends legislative evidence to the Bermuda 
government’s stance that the island is“ commit[ed] to be[ing] at the forefront of 
transparency and cooperation by helping other jurisdictions claim revenue they 
believe their taxpayers are obligated to pay.”152 
 
Bermuda’s comprehensive ownership data collection and plethora of 
international agreements has seen Bermuda ranked below both the US and UK in the 
Tax Justice Network’s Financial Secrecy Index.153 This serves to further dispell 
public, political, and lawmaker misconceptions that Bermuda is committed to secrecy 
and undermines international transparency efforts. These international agreements, in 
addition to the comprehensive collection of ownership data, further acts to decentivise 
Bermuda as a choice of destination for criminals intending to use shell companies to 
hide profits. It is found through the above, that Bermuda is in fact opposed and 
actively attempting to do its part in curing some of the ills of the modern international 
finance system.  
 
 
Chapter IV: Discussion of Findings 
 
4.1  Is Justification Possible? 
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  This chapter serves to bring together detailed analysis undertaken in both 
chapters 2 and 3 to ascertain the exact possibility of justification for the imposition of 
a public register of beneficial ownership in Bermuda. Bermuda’s standing in terms of 
beneficial ownership as analysed in Chapter 3 will be directly discussed in regards to 
the UK’s beneficial ownership regime as analysed in Chapter 2. This will enable the 
reader to understand whether the UK has a position in mandating transparency 
standards regarding company ownership to Bermuda the same as it intends to do with 
Cayman and BVI (amongst other OTs). To this end, critical contrasts between the UK 
and Bermuda regimes will be consolidated and highlighted. This chapter will then 
move on to discussing the potential impacts of the introduction of a public register on 
Bermuda’s financial centre, especially in light of the response of its major trading 
partner. This will enable to reader to ascertain whether or not a pubic register is 
necessary to Bermuda in light of its current legislative framework and unique 
features. Finally, and most importantly, the legal challenges surrounding such an 
imposition by Amendment 167 will be stressed as a vital argument against the 
proposal at the centre of this piece. 
 
 4.1.1   UK and Bermuda: Comparative Review 
 
When the analysis of chapters 2 and 3 are taken alongside each other, it clearly 
emerges that Bermuda has collected ownership information for far longer than the 
UK. This is significant in the argument of this piece in that Bermuda’s regime is tried 
and tested: with its long establishment, there is no doubt that the current state of 
affairs has been proven to work for Bermuda. Though not public like the UK’s, this 
research points to the fact that Bermuda’s regime is more comprehensive through the 
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various processes and safeguards provided for within Acts of Bermuda Parliament. 
The UK’s register, however, has been widely criticised in its infancy (as displayed in 
chapter 2). While the UK’s regime is undoubtedly less complex than Bermuda’s, this 
does not directly imply increased effectiveness and transparency.  
 
Inaccuracies analysed in chapter 2 in regards to the information contained in 
the UK register largely stem from reliance upon self-reporting. As previously 
conveyed, it is highly unlikely that criminals who are committed to evading taxes and 
funnelling profits will feel compelled to file accurate information. In contrast, 
Bermuda’s heavily regulated central registry relies on the submission of information 
by CSPs registered with the BMA and regulated by various Acts. In addition to this, 
powers delegated to the Minister of Finance to inspect such register further bolsters 
the possibility of Bermuda receiving accurate ownership data. This is supported in 
writing: “Key options are regulating company service providers to verify who is 
behind the companies they set up, or mandating that company owners self report to a 
central register. Evidence to date suggests that regulating CSPs is more effective.”154 
 
In addition to this, academic research indicates that Bermuda facilitates the 
creation of shell companies than the UK itself. This is in direct contradiction to the 
UK’s stance that Bermuda undermines Britain’s transparency efforts: it would indeed 
appear that Britain has hindered its own efforts by failing to introduce a central 
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registry sooner. In an academic study undertaken by J. Sharman155, it was found-to 
much surprise- that it was indeed easier to set up a shell company in the UK than it 
was in Bermuda. This suggests that the UK “get its house in order”, as David 
Cameron earlier suggested to the OTs, including Bermuda. This indicates hypocrisy 
of the highest concern. 
 
This research also found that Bermuda, with beneficial ownership threshold 
criteria of just 10%, compares quite favourably to the UK’s current threshold of 25%. 
This indicates that Bermuda is far stricter than the UK in terms of identifying 
beneficial ownership by giving criminals potentially looking to avoid such threshold 
less opportunity to do so.  Bermuda’s register, in this regard, further serves to convey 
a further degree of comprehensiveness as established by Bermudian legislators and 
regulators.  
 
Also critical in the comparison of the UK and Bermuda’s ownership regimes 
is the updating of such ownership information. As conveyed, the UK requires 
companies to file updated ownership information with each annual statement, 
receiving information on a yearly basis. Bermuda, however, requires permission of 
transfers to be sought by the BMA, therefore retaining the ability to track transfer of 
shares and ownership as they happen. This, as discussed, ensures Bermuda has access 
to comprehensive information regarding complex ownership changes. The UK misses 
out on this detailed tracking ability through the somewhat lax stipulation of annual 
declarations. This was found to be the final ‘nail in the coffin’ in the comparison of 
UK and Bermuda regimes, a further testament to the robustness of Bermuda’s current 
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legislative framework.  
 
 Through stricter controls in the form of exchange permissions, lower threshold 
criteria, and a distinct lack of dependency upon self-reporting, this detailed research 
indicates the superiority of Bermuda’s regime in relation to the UK, its potential 
legislative imposer.  
 
4.1.2   Public Register in Bermuda: Is it worth it? 
 
In addition to an uncovered degree of British hypocrisy surrounding the 
introduction of a public register in Bermuda, there is an explicit need to discuss the 
potential negative impacts upon Bermuda as a financial centre. This will enable the 
reader to further draw conclusions as to the exact necessity of such an extreme 
measure in Bermuda. 
 
Amendment 167, if imposed, has the very real possibility to unduly 
disadvantage Bermuda’s economy. As explored in chapter 2, public registers are 
simply not yet the global standard. Imposing such a standard upon Bermuda would 
mandate an unlevelled playing field in terms of international financial activities. This 
standard, which could be perceived to be ‘over the top’, may act as a disincentive to 
company formation in Bermuda, despite previously discussed advantages of the 
jurisdiction. This is especially true in relation to Gibraltar and the Crown 
Dependencies, who have explicitly been excluded from threat of imposition. Law-
abiding citizens engaged in international business that value privacy could very well 
leave Bermuda due to the forced publicity of often-sensitive financial information. 
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More critically, the island risks the loss of US business due to the US’ 
unwillingness to implement a public register. These businesses may very well 
perceive the measure to be ‘over-regulation’, finding the negative impacts of 
publicity-and therefore loss of valued privacy- too important to simply ignore. This is 
especially significant as the US is Bermuda’s largest trading partner (as previously 
noted), with a large portion of the island’s economy dependent upon a positive 
business relation with the world leader. The exodus of reputable US businesses 
directly threatens the livelihoods of thousands of Bermudians reliant upon the 
successes of Bermuda’s financial centre. Morally, this poses an issue; how does the 
UK justify damaging the wellbeing of thousands of British Overseas Territories 
Citizens?  
 
The activities undertaken in Bermuda in regard to insurance and reinsurance 
may also be perceived to have a moral dimension. As previously discussed, Bermuda 
provides an astounding amount of catastrophe capital globally, aiding the rebuilding 
of multiple countries after natural and manmade disaster. Much of the developed 
world also benefits from post-catastrophe capital emanating from Bermuda: how does 
the UK justify risking such service to the developing world? This may counteractively 
negatively impact the developing world in far more considerable ways than a public 
register may benefit it.  
 
Also of importance is the loss of information an imposition of a public register 
has the potential to trigger. The previously discussed plethora of Bermuda’s 
multilateral agreements, including TIEAs and transparency initiatives could be lost in 
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favour of a simpler, and less effective regime of beneficial ownership collection. This 
may result in the loss of comprehensive cooperation, by which relevant foreign 
authorities are lesser able to access accurate data imperative to their investigations. 
 
With the above taken into account along with the fundamental flaws of public 
registers conveyed in chapter 2, it is clear that there is no convincing argument for 
forgoing Bermuda’s current regime in favour of the UK’s desires. It is clear to see 
that Bermuda has far too much at stake to implement an under-researched legal 
measure upon which very little concrete information is available. That is not to say, 
however, that a public register is not advisable in Bermuda. Rather, this research 
points toward the conclusion that Bermuda would be willing to consider such a 
measure if it becomes a global standard. This is evident in the analysis that Bermuda 
has much to lose if a public register is implemented at this time, with its major trading 
partner and other offshore centres not following suit. There is no indication that 
Bermuda is directly opposed to such a register, as the jurisdiction has very publicly 
committed to transparency measures in the past. Rather, it is not the right time to do 
so: and when that time comes, it is for the Parliament of Bermuda to legislate. 
 
4.2  Legal Obstacle 
 
The  critical legal obstacle presented through the potential imposition of 
Amendment 167 renders the imposition of a public register in Bermuda not only 
flawed on a logical basis, but also a legal basis. The lack of explicit provision for Her 
Majesty to legislate via Order in Council as analysed in subsection 3.1.2 point to 
British lawmaker desire to bypass the consitution of a self-governing territory with an 
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extremely high degree of autonomy. This is clearly unacceptable in modern times, 
especially as Britain attempts to distance itself from its colonial past. Though 
lawmakers have previously expressed their hesitancy to legislate for Bermuda, it is 
explicit that there is a considerable portion who do not subscribe to such hesitancy.  
 
Moral argument may further extend to this critical flaw in the UK position. It 
must be boldly acknowledged that the UK intends to legislate on behalf of over 
70,000 British Overseas Territories Citizens. Critically, this legislative imposition has 
the potential to immensely damage thousands of citizen livelihoods, which as 
previously noted largely depend upon the island’s success in international business. 
How does the UK Parliament justify imposing legislation with such immense 
potential impact upon citizens whom have no direct representation in Westminster? 
This raises serious legal philosophical questions surrounding self-governance of 
Bermuda and the wider OTs. 
 
Detailed research of Amendment 167’s legal standing within Bermuda’s 
consitution by all accounts points toward a very real possibility of constitutional 
crisis. If British lawmakers are willing to overried Bermuda’s consitution in this 
regard, where else may they find justification for doing so? How far does this have 
the potential to go? Does this render the entirety of Bermuda’s consitution invalid in 
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Chapter V: Conclusion 
 
This dissertation has undertaken the first steps of ground-breaking research in 
regards to a recent British legislative development concerning Bermuda. Through 
analysis of Amendment 167 to the Criminal Finances Act 2017 as tabled by Baroness 
Stern, it was found that British lawmakers have taken a distinctively superior moral 
position to their potential legislative imposition upon Bermuda. Fuelled by highly 
emotive public and political discourse, the extreme proposal appeared to be tabled 
almost unquestioned. This work has attempted to lend legislative grounding to 
contemporary legal debate.  
 
The discussion undertaken in chapter 2 appears to be the first detailed research 
aimed at fully comprehending Amendment 167. This was facilitated through 
discussion of political, legislative, and theoretical dimensions of such a measure. It 
was found that while the UK’s position on public registers is admirable, there are 
serious flaws present with not only the UK’s register in its infancy, but also in the 
notion of public registers themselves. These manifest in the form of fears over loss of 
privacy, incomplete and innacurate information, lack of detailed tracking, and room 
for criminals to rearrange affairs to maintain a position off the radar of relevant 
authorities. 
 
Chapter 3 appears to be the first academic study to attempt to put forth the 
exceptional case of Bermuda. Analysis of the island’s financial industry, taxation 
regime, and constitution clearly outlined Bermuda as sharply distinct from other OTs 
targeted by Amendment 167. Further to this, the chapter appears to be the first 
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attempt at in-depth independent research concerning Bermuda’s regime of beneficial 
ownership collection. The findings of Bermuda’s robust, comprehensive, and 
historical legal regime regarding ownership transparency served as solid evidence for 
the case of Bermuda’s unique treatment in regards to Baroness Stern’s proposal. This 
chapter also served to dispell misconception of Bermuda as a secrecy jurisdiction, a 
notion rife within public, political, and now legal discourse. 
 
Chapter 4 consolidated research findings in chapters 2 and 3 to make well-
informed statements towards the overall necessity of Amendment 167’s proposed 
imposition upon Bermuda. It was found that Bermuda’s register compared favourably 
to the UK’s own, and avoided many of the fundamental flaws of public registers as 
explored in chapter 2. In addition to this, it was found that the future of Bermuda’s 
success as an international financial centre hangs in the balance of UK desires. 
Through potential creation of an unlevelled playing field, loss of business and loss of 
existing interntional cooperation mechanisms, it became apparent that the costs of a 
public register far outweigh potential benefits. This is exacerbated by the fact that 
potential benefits of public registers have yet to be understood. In addition to this, it 
was found that the UK’s potential imposition, justified on moral grounds, has 
overlooked important moral questions raised by the proposal. The Amendment calls 
into questions consitutional integrity, loss of catastrophe capital to the developing 
world, and legislating harmful mechanisms into a society by a Parliament in which 
they do not have representation. Of immense importance was the Consitution of 
Bermuda’s explicit reservation of power for Her Majesty to impose Orders in 
Council, rendering Baroness Stern’s proposal as not legally viable nor justified as it 
called for an essential consitutional crisis for the island. 
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Overall, this work has found that the case for Bermuda’s exceptional treatment 
in regards to Amendment 167 is compelling. On the other hand, the necessity of a 
public register in Bermuda does not  appear as compelling. Comparison of UK and 
Bermuda beneficial ownership regimes, by which Bermuda made out superior, made 
this explicit. Amendment 167 to the Criminal Finances Act 2017, through the 
research undertaken in this piece, is rendered as a misguided politically-motivated 
legislative imposition, with immense potential negative impacts and little proven 
benefits. 
 
As a result of these findings, this work concludes that Amendment 167 in 
regards to Bermuda cannot be justified on any grounds. 
 
 
5.1 Towards the Future 
 
The research contained within this piece displays a fundamental 
misconception regarding Bermuda’s financial centre, legislation, and overall 
international in cooperation in regards to transparency. The findings of the research 
identify a gap in lawmaker understanding, and highlight an explicit need for British 
lawmakers to asses each OT on a case-by-case basis, instead of grouping them for the 
sake of simplicity. A “one-size-fits-all” approach is not only inefficient, but harmful 
to Bermuda which strives to distance itself from more its more notorious counterparts, 
Cayman and BVI.  
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This research also identified a gap in understanding of the exact benefits of 
public registers of beneficial ownership. This serves as a call for academic research 
upon such an emerging standard while also conveying the importance of 
understanding such a mechanism before forcefully legislating it into self-governing 
territories of the UK. 
 
Amendment 167 was eventually dropped during the research of this work, and 
did not succeed in providing for a new clause in the Criminal Finances Act 2017. This 
however, does not render such research obsolete. As conveyed, the push for 
transparency in the OTs has been a recurring legal theme for a number of years. With 
attacks upon Bermuda increasing in frequency and by individuals with increasingly 
high profiles, Bermuda can expect the notion behind Amendment 167 to resurface. 
The findings of this research may serve as useful to future desires of UK imposition 
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